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Breaking the Dynamics of Emotions and Fear 
in Conflict and Reconstruction
Abstract: This paper is all about the construction of a new analytical frame-
work to understand conflict and cooperation both at the international and at 
the domestic level with the aim of then finding mechanisms to reduce tensions 
and initiate conflict resolution schemes. The existing research literature on such 
analytical frameworks has so far been conducted a) mostly on standard social 
science disciplinary lines and has not incorporated the important work done on 
these questions by neuro-scientists and behavioral geneticists and b) is not really 
capable except in very specific instances to deal with the evolving dynamics of 
conflict and cooperation. Conflict over scarce resources (territory, mates, food) 
between members of the same species is a universal feature of evolution. Often 
conflict, especially armed conflict is supposed to be due to shows of force by two 
or more parties in order to appropriate or dominate resources. Force appears thus 
not to be the only decisive factor; perceived entitlement and powerful feelings 
of injustice thereby generated in the case of challenge, extended to group iden-
tity are also at the basis of conflict and aggression in humans. The relationship 
between environment and conflict, the role of emotions such as fear, and the 
absence of clear definition and enforcement of property rights within societies 
are also factors in the development of conflict. Thus we have here developed an 
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analytically based numerical model that aims to include finding on these topics 
by Neuroscience and to emphasize the role of emotions in conflict and coopera-
tion dynamics. This model has been simulated without specific reference to a par-
ticular country with the result that economic conditions drive our system since 
in one case sustained growth produces stability and end of combats whereas 
deteriorating capital growth and GDP collapse lead to increased hostile coalition 
participation and more fighting. However, the mere trigger of economic condi-
tions is insufficient to explain conflict escalation, which results from increased 
participation in mutually hostile coalitions and greater fighting propensity where 
emotions such as fear and resentment play their role. Finally a detailed empiri-
cal analysis of the current Syrian conflict has been undertaken which shows the 
ability of the model to forecast actual historical developments. This study also 
indicates that worsening economic conditions are not the only triggering factors 
in civil conflict. Perceptions of opportunities due to a weakening of a regime’s 
authority also play a major role.
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1   Difficulties of negotiation and conflict 
resolution
Conflict over scarce resources (territory, mates, food) between members of the 
same species is a universal feature of evolution. Often conflict, especially armed 
conflict is supposed to be due to shows of force by two or more parties in order 
to appropriate or dominate resources. Conflicts and warfare with their high costs 
and dubious rewards are however difficult to rationalize even though they seem 
to continue to occur: The choice of the use of force is taken despite the fact that 
it often leads to very uncertain outcomes. Force appears thus not to be the only 
decisive factor; perceived entitlement and powerful feelings of injustice thereby 
generated in the case of challenge, extended to group identity are also at the basis 
of conflict and aggression in humans. Some evidence for this is available from 
research on animal behavior: Stress contributes to social imbalance (Cordero and 
Sandi 2007).
The relationship between environment and conflict, the role of emotions 
such as fear, and the absence of clear definition and enforcement of property 
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rights within societies are also factors in the development of conflict and some-
times genocide (Luterbacher and Krasna 2010). The development of weapons and 
complex forms of social organization allowing group cooperation in aggression 
have turned simple dominance contests into a spiral of ever more complex con-
flict mechanisms that are exceedingly difficult to control. Evidence for these can 
be seen in some until now unsolvable confrontations such as the Israeli Palestin-
ian or the Pakistan Indian one. Furthermore, the existence of protracted fighting 
in many domestic contexts such as in Lebanon, Afghanistan or Iraq show the 
problem of negotiating an end to such confrontations and then building institu-
tions that will maintain domestic peace over long periods of time. This seems to 
be the case despite evidence showing that generalized reciprocity mechanisms 
can lead to cooperation in animal and human societies (Axelrod 1980; Rutte and 
Taborsky 2007).
2  Puzzles
These considerations lead to the formulation of several puzzles both empirical 
and theoretical. One can observe that often relations between human groups 
tend to be relatively peaceful until some triggering event leads to violent conflict 
like the example of former Yugoslavia shows. Moreover, even if conflict occurs 
among some groups, it does not always escalate into forms of extreme violence. 
For instance, even though the Indian Union is composed of several ethnic groups 
and religious entities, for the moment the clashes that have occasionally occurred 
between these have not evolved into more intense forms of conflict and destroyed 
the whole fabric of that society. Finally, as shown in the work of Fearon (1994) 
and Fearon and Laitin (1996), conflict initiation is hard to rationalize if its issue 
is uncertain and if its evolution leads to costly and most of the time irrevocable 
investments. A similar observation can be made about strikes. Nevertheless con-
flicts and strikes occur but as emphasized previously not necessarily. This leads 
to the idea that a significant clue to solve these puzzles must lie in the dynam-
ics of the conflict themselves. In such dynamics emotions, stress and fear might 
play a significant role. As shown in Luterbacher and Krasna (2010), fear to be 
overwhelmed by the other ethnic group played a significant role in the massacre 
of Tutsis and moderate Hutus in Rwanda in 1994. How can such dynamics better 
be understood? We believe that a static framework of analysis cannot account 
for such developments and a dynamic perspective has to be introduced at the 
analytical level as well. However, in order to be able to work out such a dynamic 
perspective, basics of decision-making in conflict and in cooperation have to be 
revisited.
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3  Decision making
Conflict and cooperation issues can be framed in terms of individual or collec-
tive decision making: One can describe an individual or a collective in terms of 
a decision process that results into initiating or responding to conflictual moves 
of an opponent or conversely to seek a more peaceful and cooperative outcome 
and thus not to escalate aggression but rather to diffuse it and to foster collabora-
tion. Among the explanatory schemes put forward to understand such decision 
processes rational choice approaches have always played an important role in 
the economic and political science literature. A traditional way to consider this 
problem takes for granted 1) that decision-makers are essentially risk neutral, 
occasionally weakly risk averse preference and utility maximizers, and 2) that 
probabilities about crucial outcomes such as winning wars or the costs associ-
ated with them are essentially given by nature and are not based on subjective 
estimates by the parties involved. The same can be said about types (usually 
hard or soft) that protagonists to a conflict are supposed to represent: They are 
assumed to be given by a random draw out of a predetermined probability dis-
tribution. The resulting theory of conflict and war is relatively simple: war may 
occur because two parties do not have complete information about each other’s 
means or each other’s preferences. Moreover, within the framework of incomplete 
information, fighting involves taking short-term losses but may help creating a 
reputation that will keep opponents away in the future. While such reputation 
building is certainly plausible, it is sometimes hard to figure out when very weak 
powers nevertheless confront very strong ones (re. the Israel Palestinian conflict 
and the two successive Intifadas). Moreover, to work, it requires the introduc-
tion of the notion of commitment that is supposed to overcome the reluctance 
decision-makers might have for costly actions. Why certain categories of decision 
makers choose to commit and others do not is again left to a random selection of 
types left to nature.
In other words, the framework that is provided so far by this type of litera-
ture over emphasizes information problems and results in a relatively static view 
of conflict and cooperation processes where most of the relevant parameters are 
supposed to be determined before they start. The incorporation of emotional 
components of conflict and cooperation as well as their dynamic interaction 
effects such as tit for tat responses in aggressive escalatory moves requires a revi-
sion of these standard explanatory schemes. In particular, they lead to the ques-
tion if traditional rational choice theories are adequate in representing escalatory 
evolutions well. An agent, according to our conception, can be rational and all 
of a sudden stop cooperating, if pressured too much, and initiate conflict. This 
choice for conflict should thus be included as equilibrium behavior. On the other 
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hand, cooperative behavior could also result from the recognition by opponents 
that pressuring the other side too much might result in an equilibrium in conflict, 
an outcome that is best avoided. The perspective evoked here differs thus from 
the one based purely on incomplete information about the type of another agent. 
In some sense we are seeking to explain the choice of a gamble that might lead 
to a conflict with a chancy outcome, which is determined endogenously by the 
succession of moves and counter-moves that agents engage in. One should also 
account for the fact that once conflict has started it can result in an escalatory 
process that is difficult to stop and is likely to generate costs beyond all initial 
estimates before it finally ends. This conflict or “war trap” outcome should be 
used to explain situations that are not included in the classical conception, which 
focuses exclusively on war initiation. In our view, war initiation is just part of the 
story. If it were the only puzzle to explain then armed conflicts would not neces-
sarily lead to tragic consequences since a few battles or even skirmishes would 
be sufficient to establish the superiority or equality between two bargainers who 
decide to fight it out. That these bargainers have incentives to escalate and then 
to keep fighting is what a new approach to rationality should help to establish. In 
order to proceed with the proposed revision of standard explanatory frameworks 
that we want to undertake here, a clarification of the links between emotions and 
conflict as seen by neuro-science and behavioral genetics is necessary.
4  Emotionality, conflict resolution and aggression
Conflicts between different parties (individuals, groups, nations) are rarely 
devoid of eliciting deep emotions in the respective opponents. From an evolu-
tionary point of view, negative emotions linked to social confrontations, such as 
anxiety, anger and disgust evolved by facilitating the avoidance of similar dangers 
during our species’ development (Hofer 1995). They alerted the individual to 
existing threats and indicated that defensive actions are needed (Gilbert 2001; 
Nesse 1999). Price et al. (2004) included anger with assertiveness as an escalatory 
emotion, associated with the escalation of conflict. In contrast, positive affects 
evolved in the context of success, safeness and security (Gilbert 2001).
The end of a conflict may, through reconciliation of the two parties, bring 
relief by decreasing the level of negative affect and/or by increasing the level of 
positive affect. When dominant contests are clearly resolved, the dominant part 
generally feels rewarded and reassured on its dominance quality, while the loser 
part can either accept defeat and progressively adapt to the situation (and from 
there on engage in other tasks) or enter into a “maladaptive” cycle characterized 
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by high negative emotionality (i.e., anxiety, anger go into overdrive by operating 
at a greater intensity and/or over a prolonged period of time). In many occa-
sions, the part facing inevitable defeat may remain in “fight mode” associated 
to a feeling of injustice or unfairness (Collins 2008). This fight mode frequently 
represents a need for “retaliation.” When there is a failure of reconciliation due 
to external constraints (such is frequently the case with the current organization 
of our society) to the open resolution of conflicts among rivals, with the conflict 
enduring in an unresolved state, emotional escalation is generally observed in 
both parts. Unfairness is generally felt by both opponents. Lack of conflict reso-
lution is associated with a mutual feeling of loosing something that each part 
respectively feels as genuinely belonging to them (identification process of the 
contestants with the disputed goal). While the conflict is not solved, each part is 
under the threat of experiencing a big loss (which in psychological terms would 
bring increased and sustained anxiety). Unsatisfactory attempts to negotiate 
can bring escalation of high negative emotionality (i.e., anxiety, anger) to both 
parts. In all these cases, high negative emotionality operates as a main obsta-
cle to achieve the resolution of the conflict. In most conflict cases, for rational 
approaches to succeed towards conflict resolution, high negative emotionality 
needs to be truly overcome.
Emotions are also at the core of violence. The most ubiquitous emotion in 
situations of violent threat is confrontational tension/fear (Collins 2008). Some 
authors emphasize the fact that violence is difficult, not easy. In their view, 
for violence to happen, the situation must present a way for at least some par-
ticipants to circumvent confrontational tension/fear (Collins 2008). In human 
populations, there are two main ways of addressing violence: (i) hot emotional 
violence, with the most typical emotion being anger. However, the mere presence 
of a hot emotion is not enough for successful violence to occur; the hot emotion 
needs to be configured in such a way across the group so that confrontational 
tension/fear is overcome; (ii) cool technical violence, in which the violent activ-
ists manage their own emotions and take advantage of the emotional weaknesses 
of their opponents. In reality, conflicts can have combinations of hot and cold 
approaches
5  Evolutionary basis of emotionality
In Neuroscience, the view is emerging that much of human mental activity 
is driven by the ancient affective emotional and motivational brain systems 
shared with other animals (Gardner and Wilson 2004). It is now clear that all 
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mammalian brains share a large number of basic emotional systems (Panksepp 
2005). Since core emotional tendencies seem to emerge from ancient brain pro-
cesses shared by all mammals, this effectively allows one to utilize cross-species 
evolutionary strategies, relying on animal brain–behavior models. We should 
be able to shed light into core human emotional tendencies by studying animal 
brains (Panksepp 2005). Therefore, one can define specific emotional traits that 
can be studied in nonhuman mammals.
Mammalian brains contain circuits that are critically involved in basic emo-
tions, including anger (provoked when organisms do not get what they want), 
fear, separation distress and social bonding (Panksepp 2006). These circuits 
appear to be homologous across all mammalian species. An example is given by 
the aggression level and dominance hierarchy established between two male rats 
when stress (a fear-induction experience) is given to one of the two rats in the 
contest. In our model, a social hierarchy established by two male rats during a 
first encounter is not maintained one week later. If one of the two rats is stressed, 
the stressed rat becomes subordinate and the hierarchy that is formed is main-
tained. In addition, we have evaluated the role of “intrinsic stress” (i.e., high 
anxiety trait) in the formation of the social hierarchy and found that high anxiety 
trait predicts (60–75%) the development of social subordination when the contest 
is hold with a low anxious individual. Thus, we have shown that stress can have a 
deleterious impact in individuals’ position in the social scale, as well as increas-
ing social inequality.
In contrast to the difficulty of evaluating and manipulating these systems 
in humans, it is by far easier to explore them systematically (e.g., their neural 
circuitry, molecular and gene determinants, physiological and behavioral cor-
relates) in animal models. It is, therefore, essential to integrate the animal and 
human work to make optimal progress on the most interesting variables in 
such analyses. Thus, the use of animal models is considered to be an excellent 
tool to help clarifying the foundational nature of the human mind (Panksepp 
2006).
6  Evolutionary basis of cooperation
Reciprocity has been frequently proposed as a mechanism to explain the evo-
lution of cooperation between unrelated individuals (Trivers 1971). There are 
different forms of reciprocity: (i) direct reciprocity, in the form of tit-for-tat, that 
can lead to the evolution of cooperative behaviors when individuals return one 
favor with another (Axelrod and Hamilton 1981); (ii) indirect reciprocity, in which 
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individuals cooperate with other individuals that they have previously seen engag-
ing in cooperation with others (Nowak and Sigmund 1998a,b, 2005); (iii) general-
ized reciprocity, in which an individual cooperates if it has experienced cooperation 
before, regardless of the identity of the partner (Hamilton and Taborsky 2005; 
Pfeiffer et al. 2005; Rutte and Taborsky 2007). Both direct and indirect reciprocity 
require highly advanced cognitive abilities (Dugatkin 2002), in which individuals 
must recognize a cooperating individual, and use this information to act accord-
ingly. However, generalized reciprocity only relies on information from the previ-
ous interaction, and therefore it does not require sophisticated cognitive abilities.
In rats, evidence for both generalized (Rutte and Taborsky 2007) and direct 
(Rutte and Taborsky 2008) reciprocity has been reported. Generalized reciprocity 
was shown in form of cooperative behavior influenced by prior receipt of help, 
irrespective of the identity of the partner (Rutte and Taborsky 2007). In the study, 
rats that were trained in an instrumental cooperative task (pulling a stick in order 
to produce food for a partner) pulled more often for an unknown partner after 
they had been helped than if they had not received help before. Direct reciproc-
ity was also shown in the form of a higher propensity of rats to cooperate with a 
known partner who had helped them before (Rutte and Taborsky 2008). Levels of 
cooperation observed in this case were higher (50.7%) than for generalized reci-
procity. Theoretical models have shown that the expression of direct reciprocity 
in a population will induce the evolution of generalized reciprocity (Nowak and 
Roch 2007), bringing about much higher levels of cooperation overall.
Given that no special cognitive abilities are required for generalized reciproc-
ity, as individuals only need to remember and act regarding their own last experi-
ence with any partner, it has been suggested that the underlying neurobiological 
mechanisms can be rather simple hormonal or neuronal mechanisms (Rutte and 
Taborsky 2007). Generalized reciprocity is functionally related to the winner 
and loser effects, where anonymous social experience also influences behavior 
in subsequent interactions, and the neurobiological mechanisms underlying 
winner/loser effects and generalized reciprocity might be similar (Singer et  al. 
2004). Hormonal changes experienced under socio-positive or socio-negative 
experiences may critically affect the tendency to cooperate. Recently, oxytocin 
was shown to influence pro-social behavior in human (Baumgartner et al. 2008; 
Kosfeld et al. 2005; Zak et al. 2005) and rats (Uvnas-Moberg 1998). Vasopressin is 
a similar small neuropeptide that also plays strong roles in social and affective 
behaviors (Meyer-Lindenberg 2008). Thus, oxytocin was shown to limit the fear 
of betrayal in social interactions, in line with animal data showing that it inhibits 
defensive behavior and facilitates maternal behavior and pair-bonding (Mendres 
and de Waal 2000). Striatal areas, more generally linked with reward processing, 
have been suggested to play a role in mutual cooperation (Fehr and Camerer 2007; 
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Zak et al. 2005). However, existing knowledge about the neurobiological mecha-
nisms underlying these complementary social processes is scarce.
Timmer et  al. (2011) show that anxiety trait is highly predictive for social 
dominance; highly anxious (HA) animals tend to become submissive during an 
encounter when matched for weight to low anxious (LA) conspecifics as apparent 
from both total duration of offensive behavior (Figure 1, right panel).
Systemic administration of the anxiolytic drug Diazepam (known better by 
its commercial name, Valium) reduces anxiety on the EPM (Figure 2, left panel) 
while it enhances dominancy (absolute and relative) in HA rats (Figure 2, right 
panel).
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These findings indicate a very strong role for anxiety-like personalities in 
the resolution of social conflicts linked to the establishment of hierarchies. They 
also show that anxiolytic drugs can change the outcome of a social encounter. 
Altogether, these observations provide key information to interpret dynamics of 
social interactions.
7  Agent based modeling
Given some of the weaknesses that we have pointed out concerning the existing 
rational choice conceptions of conflict and cooperation, new ways of representing 
decision making about aggression and collaboration have been presented under 
the general framework of computational agent based modeling. These will also 
integrate some of the major findings of the neuro-science research outlined above 
and tested in animal populations Instead of relying on the traditional expected 
utility model which involves a description of two protagonists or assumes that all 
parties have similar preference functions, this type of approach is set on develop-
ing computer models of interacting agents which can be given similar or different 
characteristics. In this context, the contribution by Bhavnani and Backer (1999) 
appears to be particularly elaborate because they are trying to build on previous 
formulations developed by political scientists on ethnic conflict. The emphasis of 
that earlier work by Fearon and Laitin (1996) and Lohmann (1993) is centered on 
information questions. Conflict will be initiated or amplified by information cir-
culating mostly within one group and directed against the other. Misperceptions 
about the other group can lead to armed violence. As specified by Bhavnani and 
Backer (1999, 11): “agents belong to one of two ethnic groups: group A or group 
B. As a matter of convenience, we let group A represent the ethnic group in power 
and group B the rival ethnic group. Depending upon the circumstances, either 
group could be a minority. We define q as the proportion of group A in the overall 
population. At time t, every member of group A has a probability of following the 
ethnic cue (E) and of refraining from following the ethnic cue (R). The balance 
of probabilities depends on the type of message that is transmitted, the individ-
ual’s level of extremism .., and the strength of any metanorm.1 The metanorm 
dictates that any member ai who fails to follow the ethnic cue when the message 
is national is killed by another member aj with a probability of m.”
1 A metanorm is according to Axelrod (1986) a norm that serves to enforce a group norm, here 
the agent who does not follow the ethnic cue of the group he belongs to will be punished himself.
Breaking the Dynamics of Emotions and Fear in Conflict      489
Without denying the importance of information questions in the generation 
of armed conflict, one can nevertheless legitimately ask about the importance of 
other factors especially in the context of developing or emerging countries. Quite 
a few authors (Andre and Plateau 1998; Collier and Hoeffler 2000; Homer-Dixon 
1994) have pointed out the importance of resource issues in explaining conflict at 
least as a long-term factor. Information issues raised by Bhavnani and Backer are 
considered without reference to a specific context. However, context matters and 
in the case of the Rwandan genocide for instance as in others fear particularly 
about losing the control of important resources appears to be a powerful motiva-
tor for extreme behavioral responses in general and for conflict and violence in 
particular. These objections show that so far agent based computational mod-
eling has not moved much beyond some of the restrictive assumptions of tradi-
tional rational choice modeling in the sense that it also tends to stick to a rather 
static characterization of individual behavior. In addition it tends sometimes to 
ignore contextual information such as reaction to evolving actions of others or 
the evolution of the agent’s resource base. In contrast, Cederman (2003, 2005) 
has attempted to construct computational models that reflect much more closely 
the contextual base of agent’s behavior in conflicts and showed therefore that 
introducing more complex representations within this general framework is pos-
sible. Agent based modeling remains thus an important and promising alley for 
the representation of conflict behavior even though more variety and flexibility 
as well as the possibility to include dynamic feedback interactions into it have to 
be incorporated into it.
8  Overall conceptual difficulties
In the social and especially political science literature on conflict, the integration 
between emotional and rational choice explanations of conflict is poorly realized. 
Superficially, these two factors, emotions and reason seem to be at opposite ends 
of an explanatory spectrum. However, a common ground can be found if one 
follows the intuition that emotions are associated with rare and unusual events 
such as serious threats to existence or the prospect of severe losses of wealth or 
physical, property, territory or physical integrity. Such considerations are impor-
tant if one wants to model decision-making behavior accurately.
Rational choice, particularly expected utility approaches have been poor at 
dealing with such situations. Early axiomatizations of expected utility theory 
such as those put forward by von Neumann and Morgenstern (1947) or Fried-
man and Savage (1948), essentially ignored the issue. It was the merit of the 
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French economist Maurice Allais (1953) to have raised the problem of taking 
into account rare or very constraining events. He illustrated his criticism of the 
traditional approaches with the following anecdote: If a traveler is caught in 
Marseilles with a minimal amount of money not sufficient to buy a ticket and 
has to reach Paris imperatively, any gamble that will give him the greatest prob-
ability of winning more than the price of his ticket will be worth entering into 
regardless of absolute utility maximization procedures. Allais’ considerations 
led to the formulation of the well-known Allais paradox in the literature. To 
take these issues into account Chichilnisky (2009a) has developed a new axi-
omatic system that can deal with extreme or unusual events so called “black 
swans” in order to account for attitudes involving fear of catastrophes. She has 
in particular been able to show that her new axiomatic is capable of including 
both normal and unusual events into a single analytical framework. A similar 
approach is taken in the so-called Rank dependent Expected Utility Theory due 
originally to Quiggin (1982) but then developed among others by Chateauneuf, 
Cohen, and Meilijson (2005). The psychologists Kahneman and Tversky (1979) 
through their development of “prospect theory” have shown that Allais’ consid-
erations were backed by empirical observations and that decisions in uncertain 
situations are taken under two general perspectives: 1. Ordinary individuals 
tend to be risk averse under the prospect of gains and risk preferring under the 
prospect of losses. 2. They tend to overestimate the likelihood of low probabil-
ity events and underestimate the likelihood of high probability ones. Fearful 
reactions are often motivated by the prospect of losses associated with some 
specific event either natural or social: A natural catastrophe or a massive social 
upheaval will lead to risky gambling and make conflict outcomes more likely 
despite their own prospective high costs. In addition, the analysis of escalation 
processes started by Martin Shubik (1971) and pursued by Barry O’Neill (1986) 
with the dollar auction game constitutes an attempt to deal explicitly with the 
rational analysis of conflict dynamics and to show that even rational moves 
may lead to irrational outcomes.
Also contextual evolutions of social interactions such as environmental 
change are often caused by a combination of natural and social forces. Human 
activities can lead to overuse of natural resources which then result in scarci-
ties and these scarcities can then lead to emotional reactions and thus to taking 
risky gambles and to conflict. Given the fact that the empirical evidence about 
the relations between environment and conflict is ambiguous, it suggests that the 
link between the two issues only makes sense and works whenever institutional 
factors such as the clear definition and enforcement of property rights are absent 
or weak within or across societies and thus when fear about property losses moti-
vates individuals and groups to act aggressively.
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9  Basic model
This basic model builds on previous research by Luterbacher and Norrlof (2008) 
and Chichilnisky (2009b) and Chichilnisky et  al. (2000). The objective of the 
model is first to combine some of the various strands of theory that have been 
used to explain conflict: Among those the contributions by Bhavnani and Backer 
(1999) and Bhavnani et  al. (2011) appears to be particularly elaborate because 
they are trying to build on previous formulations developed by political scien-
tists on ethnic conflict. The emphasis of that earlier work by Fearon and Laitin 
(1996) and Lohmann (1993) is centered on information questions. Conflict will 
be initiated or amplified by information circulating mostly within one group 
and directed against the other. Misperceptions about the other group can lead to 
armed violence. To this Bhavnani et al. (2011) add a particular concern about the 
location of conflict and how violence is territorially determined2 and influenced 
by social distance. Without denying the importance of information questions, 
territoriality and social distance in the generation of armed conflict, one can 
nevertheless legitimately ask about the importance of other factors. Quite a few 
authors (Andre and Plateau 1998; Collier and Hoeffler 1998, 2000; Homer-Dixon 
1994) have pointed out the importance of resource issues in explaining conflict 
at least as a long-term factor. Information issues raised by Bhavnani and Backer 
(1999) and Bhavnani et al. (2011) are considered without reference to a specific 
context. However, context matters and in several cases of conflict both domestic 
and international fear appears to be a powerful motivator for extreme behavio-
ral responses in general and for conflict and violence in particular. Such behav-
ioral responses appear irrational at the outset and cannot usually be explained 
through standard models of decision making such as expected utility as shown 
convincingly by Chichilnisky (2009b).3 Quite clearly, fear is also closely linked 
to rumor and thus often to false information transmissions. Moreover, fear has a 
tendency then to build upon itself and to influence thus conflict dynamics: Fear 
of the other will lead to suppress the other violently, which will then in reaction 
draw more people who feel threatened to rally toward him as much as opponents 
will rally against him. Fear and other “emotional” factors in conflict such as a 
feeling of injustice are precisely what neuroscience research has emphasized. 
How can one now tie all these aspects together?
2 Such a territorial emphasis and the relationships it implies between armed groups and the 
civilian population has been pioneered by Kalyvas (2006) Kalyvas and Kocher (2009).
3 She suggests an alternative axiomatization of utility theory topology as already mentioned 
above in order to account for attitudes involving fear of catastrophes.
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A numerical agent based model will provide numerical solutions, which can 
then be confronted and calibrated with empirical data.
10  Fundamental economic relations
We formulate the model in terms of an agent-based perspective. We take this 
approach while we remain able to explore some of the relations we want to 
emphasize with purely analytical methods. We postulate a utility function for a 
representative agent i as:
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where xi is a private good and gi a public or collective good and α an adjustment 
parameter. The shape of this utility function is quite important in the present 
context because it is concave with respect to the origin for higher levels of utility 
but convex for lower ones, it is in other words an S curve like the following Figure 3:
Standard assumptions about rational behavior assume often, in contradic-
tion with the empirical evidence, that most preference schemes whether indi-
vidual or collective can be described as either risk neutral or risk averse. These 
premises are established usually for mathematical convenience, to simplify 
complex issues and reduce them to simple linear ones. Experimental psycholo-
gists and even observers of animal behavior have noticed that risk preference 
F (x)=exp (α–1/x)
x
Figure 3: Exponential S-shaped One Variable Utility Function.
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often appears after risk aversion when a decision maker is faced with the pros-
pect of losses (Stephens 1990). Risk aversion and risk preferring behavior are 
regularly seen together, and various attempts have been made to explain their 
joint appearance. The principal analyses of hybrid risk attitudes are Battalio et al. 
(1985, 1990), Camerer (1989), Fishburn and Kochenberger (1979), and especially 
Kahneman and Tversky (1979). In particular, Fishburn and Kochenberger (1979) 
show that the majority of individuals have an everywhere increasing utility func-
tion u(x), where x is a measure of gains and losses that increases more than pro-
portionally for small or negative x and then less than proportionally for relatively 
high values of x. Most individuals are thus risk averse over gains and risk preferring 
over losses. This notion can serve as a theoretical justification for the contention 
elaborated by Hirshleifer (1991) that the poor have a comparative advantage in 
appropriation, obviously a more risky way to acquire wealth than capital accu-
mulation through savings. In general, this type of utility function leads to very 
different but also quite plausible bargaining behavior as compared to traditional 
models.4 In particular, the fact that individuals are risk preferring against losses 
translates the crucial psychological importance of the fear to loose something 
that one has acquired and thus reflects the “emotional” aspect of their decision 
making. Here emotional drivers produce rash (though not irrational) behavior. As 
has been demonstrated by Arcand and Luterbacher (2013), a similar approach to 
this one consists in postulating that each agent has a probability weighting func-
tion that distorts his or her perception of the likelihood of events as emphasized 
by the Rank Dependent Expected Utility (RDEU) theory due originally to Quiggin 
(1982). In this case a linear utility function suffices in describing the preferences 
of an agent. The two conceptions lead to equivalent results. Moreover, a conflict-
ual bargaining situation may in this case end up as equilibrium in conflict, which 
can have lasting effects (cf. again Arcand and Luterbacher 2013).
If we make the assumption that all representative agents in a society are iden-
tical, an equilibrium can be expressed by a symmetrical allocation among all N 
agents of the society (there is only one such equilibria as mentioned by Dasgupta 
and Heal 1979, 42). If all agents in society maximize utility in the same way i does, 
based upon some expectation they have on how much of the collective good every 
other agent produces or purchases, a particular kind of Nash equilibrium obtains 
for the society in question, which we will call a society market or anarchic equi-
librium. In other words, if every agent anticipates the purchase or production of 
the amount of collective good g by every other agent, for agent i, the problem is 
then to maximize:
4 The links between bargaining and risk attitudes are explored as mentioned before in Arcand 
and Luterbacher (2013).
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which is just a reformulation of utility function (1) with the assumptions enumer-
ated above.
Maximizing (2) is subject to the budget constraint established as follows: 
Assume that initially agents have one unit of the private good xi, and none of the 
collective good gi. Agents are however able to convert the private good into the 
collective good at a rate ps. If s = 1, the private good can be transformed into the 
collective good proportionally, if s < 1, the conversion takes place more than pro-
portionally, if s > 1, less than proportionally. If, for instance, gi stands for national 
defense, then s represents a measure of society’s ability to mobilize resources for 
war (the lower is s, the greater the possibility to mobilize resources). Moreover, 
assume that i saves a certain amount of xi for investment, a proportion h which 
will be accounted for in the budget constraint.
Agent i in society g can therefore maximize ui as defined in (2) subject to the 
budget constraint:
 
( 1 ) 1s i ip g h x+ + ≤  (3)
Maximizing (2) subject to (3) leads to the following equilibrium values for xi and 
gi , i.e., and ˆ:g
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These are not Pareto optimal as not enough quantities of the private good 
are converted into the public good. It is easy to compute Pareto optimal values by 
treating the public good as if it were a private good and going through the same 
optimization process as before. One gets then:
 
1ˆ ,
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(5)
From there we can now calculate the distance between the Pareto optimal solu-
tion and the “anarchic” equilibrium situation as:
 
2( 1)1 0s Np h
N
−
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(6)
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This distance can also be called E, the externality in the use of resources that has 
not been internalized through the full use of a public good. This can represent in 
some sense the fact that property rights are not sufficiently made clear or protected 
because a public good to achieve these things is not sufficiently maintained. We 
will thus interpret E as measuring here the absence of fully defined and protected 
property rights. As these have important and decisive consequences for maintain-
ing environmental goods as well as political stability, they play an important role 
in our conceptualization and our modeling effort. One can observe that when 
N = 1, E will always be 0 as it should be since when we have a single individual in 
a society all goods are private ones. We will make use of the E concept later on. A 
further quantity to be computed is the short-term advantage an agent gets from 
overuse, z, which can be expressed by the difference in the amount of private 
good she gets from the anarchic equilibrium as opposed to the Pareto optimal 
situation. z is then for positive values of the square roots:
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(7)
As can be seen z is positive provided N > 1. With N = 1, Pareto optimal and anarchic 
equilibrium are trivially equivalent as they should be in the limit case.
Through time, dynamic equations can now determine evolutions of the varia-
bles x and N and thus also E and z. N’s evolution can be determined via a dynamic 
population equation:
 
( ) ,dN N
dt
β δ= −
 
(8)
where β represents a birth (eventually plus or minus migratory balance) and δ a 
death rate.
To get at the dynamic of private goods within a society we can first define a 
capital increase rate, in the following way:
 
.i
dK Nhx K
dt
ρ= −
 
(9)
where ρ represents an amortization rate. Quite clearly, both h (savings rate) and 
ρ (amortization) are parameters linking the present to the future and determine, 
in terms of capital accumulation (if it occurs), a time horizon. This time horizon 
is longer if existing capital is not dissipated through insufficient savings and thus 
investment rates with regard to amortization.
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We can now determine Nxi through a production function such as:
 exp{ / / }.iNx K Nζ γ η ω= − −  (10)
where ζ, is an adjustment parameter and γ, and, η are elasticities of capital and 
labor with respect to production.
We will assume here that only a proportion w of the N agents are involved 
in production. This proportion to be specified below represents the number of 
agents involved in productive activities as opposed to fighting. What we intend 
to convey here is that when increasing segments of a society’s population are 
involved in fighting, production will decrease since the number of producers is 
shrinking.
11  Fighting propensity
The objective of the model is to explain a representative agent’s choice between 
producing and joining fighting forces in an unstable country. This perspective 
can help understand under which conditions the emergence of a society with 
competing warlords (as it sometimes occurs in developing countries) is more or 
less likely than the building of a politically stable and economically developed 
society. Moreover, we will try to link the question of the warlord competition to 
the issue of natural resources. We start from the following assumptions:
Assumption 1: We assume initially a society with N identical individuals, who 
can be symbolized by one representative politico-economic agent. N.B. This is a 
standard assumption which is usually included either in purely theoretical but 
also agent based models.
Assumption 1a: The above assumption will be modified in a second step in such 
a way that the society will be divided into groupings of N, M and U individuals 
which stand for coalition kernels of factions N, and M and a considerable quan-
tity of uncommitted bystanders U (an “ocean” of uncommitted individuals). A 
coalition model based upon the development of oceanic game models of coali-
tions will be used (more on this below).
Assumption 2: The representative politico-economic agent has the choice of how 
much time he wants to allocate for producing and how much for fighting. In our 
model this will be represented by a decision to optimize by using a certain propor-
tion of his time to produce, and thus to contribute to a stable political regime, 
and by using the remaining time proportion to the establishment of a “warlord 
society” through fighting.
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Assumption 3: The individual choice of the representative agent is linked to the 
aggregate decision of the society. If our representative politico-economic agent 
achieves a higher expected value by fighting and vice-versa, we can expect that 
this outcome will eventually hold for the society as a whole. We can draw an 
analogy here to Schelling’s binary decisions in an aggregate framework: the deci-
sion by one individual is conditioned by what all others are doing. To clarify this 
aspect: Each individual agent is influenced by all others in their individuality. So 
for instance if everybody drives to work it makes sense from an individual point 
of view to take public transportation because the roads are crowded. However, 
if most people take public transportation it is again worth driving. As shown by 
Moulin (1986), this condition can lead to stable or unstable Nash equilibria at the 
level of the whole society.
Assumption 4: Every agent is a producer/fighter and at the same time a consumer. 
The framework is the one of an economy, in which initially no trade with the 
outside is taking place but then eventually the economy opens up to trade.
Assumption 5: We assume that if the agent becomes a fighter, he can already 
make an initial gain at the beginning of the period by exploiting some natural 
resources or by getting a reward, which might be emotional or a mix of emotional 
and economic values. By contrast, becoming a producer demands an initial com-
mitment, an investment, which is usually longer than any commitments the 
fighter has to make. This initial investment can be, for example, the cost of edu-
cation or in a more agricultural society the cost of creating tools/machines for 
further development of productive activity. So while it is true that even a fighter 
has to make some initial commitments stricto sensu, lato sensu this one is usually 
much shorter than an investment to produce. The fighter in this sense is much 
closer to a gambler in his attitude.
We can show that want to find the level of producing/fighting, which maximizes 
the utility of a representative agent. The model is initially a static, one-period 
model, in which the representative agent is a utility-maximizer who chooses an 
individually optimal level of producing and fighting. Moreover, we can combine 
this with a coalition formation behavior which although implicit in the notion of 
social distance and communication (or absence their of used by Bhavnani et al. 
(2011) and Fearon and Laitin (1996) and Lohmann (1993) is never explicitly repre-
sented in all the formulations and theories about domestic conflict.
Assumption 5: We assume that if the agent becomes a fighter, he can already 
make an initial gain at the beginning of the period by exploiting some of the 
natural resources. By contrast, becoming a producer demands an initial commit-
ment, an investment. This initial investment can be for example the cost of edu-
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cation, or in a more agricultural society the cost of creating tools/machines for 
further development of productive activity.
Assumption 6: We assume that the only choice made in this society is one 
between fighting and producing activities. We thus ignore for the moment the 
question of how Warlords emerge or how they organize their armies. We assume 
that in an environment where lots of people are willing to fight or where our rep-
resentative agent devotes most of his time to fighting the emergence of warlords 
capable of organizing armed bands is more likely. 
We want to find the level of producing/fighting, which maximizes the utility of a 
representative agent. The model is here a static, one-period model, in which the 
representative agent is a utility-maximizer who chooses an individually optimal 
level of producing and fighting.
The representative agent has the following aforementioned utility function:
 1
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i
u c dc
=
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(11)
where Dic  is the demanded amount of a variety of the only consumption good.
For convenience, all goods produced under a regime of “warlord” or 
“stable political regime” production can be seen as varieties of one single 
good, where each of them gives an identical level of utility to the representa-
tive agent.5
As our locally non-satiated representative agent is at the same time the only 
producer and consumer in our competitive economy, and as all relative prices are 
positive, the aggregate demand for every variety of our commodity must equal its 
aggregate supply. Since we have only one agent, and by assumption initially no 
international trade takes place yet, we get:
 
,D Si ic c=  (12)
where Sic  is the produced (and supplied) amount of commodity i.
As the utility function is strictly monotonic in all varieties of the consumption 
good, and the agent basically consumes what he produces, we can focus, in our 
analysis, exclusively on the production function of the goods. In order to maxi-
mize his utility, our agent simply maximizes production.
5 As opposed to the previous utility function, which referred to the choice between public and 
private goods, this one refers to the choice between fighting and producing and is thus labeled 
uwf. The two utility functions are obviously linked, a fact that we will evoke below.
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Every variety Sic  has an identical production function, akin to the utility 
function 1.3 presented earlier:
 
expSic a w q
θ pi 
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(13)
where a = parameter, w = part of time endowment allocated for producing, q = part 
of time endowment allocated for fighting, θ = parameter expressing the gain of 
producing, π = parameter expressing the gain of fighting.
This production function exhibits at first increasing then decreasing returns 
with respect to the arguments p and q. This expresses the plausible assumption 
that initial increases in the levels of respectively fighting or producing activities 
will generate more than proportional returns in the production good Sic  but then 
eventually, with further increases of p and q, less than proportional output will 
appear. If everything that is produced is consumed agent i has simply the utility 
function .Siwf iu c=  This utility function is similar to the S-curve preference func-
tions we introduced earlier. This production/utility function is subject to the 
constraint:
 ( 1 ) ( 1 ) 1b q k w t k with t b− + + ≤ − + >>  (14)
By definition, w+q ≤  1 since both variables represent parts of a total endow-
ment. However, the initial commitment (analogous to a tax) for becoming a 
producer, which we call k, and b, the initial gain (analogous to a subsidy) of 
turning a producer into a fighter, will also affect the endowment as a whole.6 The 
“subsidy” to the fighter has to be usually more than compensated through a tax 
on the total endowment, t, which is assumed to be considerably  > b. Similarly, 
the c ommitment taken by a producer, k, which is a net contribution to the total 
endowment, has to be accounted for. All these considerations are represented in 
the constraint (14).7
Thus, we assume that there are two ways of producing a particular good. 
Either the agent can choose the “stable political regime” production technique 
under which he has to make an initial commitment in order to get a higher return 
6 The framework of the constraint is inspired by Dasgupta and Heal’s (1979) similar reasoning 
for the case of public goods.
7 We can see from this budget constraint how we could overcome the restriction posed in As-
sumption 6 and make our model necessary and sufficient for the explanation of war lord ac-
tivities: the war lord is the one who organizes the taxation of resources to distribute the initial 
subsidy to fighters.
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in the long-run or he can choose the “warlord” production technique, which 
refers to the low-technology capability of exploiting natural resources in areas 
controlled by the armed forces and gets an initial boost from the switch to fighting.
The terms θ and π correspond to the elasticity of producing and fighting, or to 
put it differently, to the impact of a marginal change in the amount of production 
and fighting time on the output.
The link between the outputs of the two rival production techniques is 
summarized in equation (15). The decision taker is myopic and only takes the 
short- and medium-run into account. As he ignores the future externalities of 
over-exploitation, he has incentives to extract more than the social optimum of 
natural resources:
 ( 1 ) ixθ pi ϕ= − +  where ϕ  =  -y E+ z (15)
where xi  = ordinary production in case of producing, z = short-run gain of over-
exploitation, E = externality of the overuse of the natural resources (positive 
number), y = extent up to which the externality can be internalized if the agent is 
a producer (number between 0 and 1).
It is a priori difficult to determine whether θ > π or π > θ, as the latter, π, 
benefits in the short-run from the gains of the over-exploitation of natural 
resources (z) and as the former θ implies regular production and efficiency 
gains from the better internalization of the externality. The short-run gains 
from overuse correspond to the increased quantity of natural resource exploi-
tation, whereas the gains of better internalization of the natural resources 
correspond to a higher sale price (as less is produced) and to a more effi-
cient exploitation of natural resources. We will first assume that the overuse 
of natural resources is quite an important factor and that accordingly θ is 
smaller than π.
We can see that if the representative agent chooses to be a producer rather 
than a fighter, a gain due to the internalization of the externality, yE, is possi-
ble, if an international cartel of the producers of the particular natural resource 
takes place or if the property rights are better protected than in the warlords-case. 
An international cartel fights the price depressing-effect and restricts the quan-
tity (less overuse) to keep prices high.8 A good level of property rights protection 
assures a more efficient exploitation of natural resources.
In addition, as described by equation (17), a high level of property rights pro-
tection may also favor the “regular” production xi .
8 Empirical cases of such international cartels include the OPEC or the coffee cartel until the 
1990s.
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Equation (18) stresses furthermore that a society with a certain control of the 
quantity produced (due to the protected property rights) is more likely to form an 
international cartel with other similar societies.
Using (13) and (14), we get the following production maximization problem:
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subject to (1-b)q+(1+k)w ≤  1-t+k , and from (15) after transformation 
1
yθ
pi
ϕ
−
=
−This can be expressed by the following Lagrangian:
 
exp ( 1 ( 1 ) ( 1 ) )
1
yL a k t b q k w
w q
θ pi θ
λ µ pi
ϕ
   
−
= − − + + − − − − + + −     −   
(17)
Calculating the partial derivatives of L with respect to w, q, λ, μ (the first-order 
conditions) gives us equation (18) after rearrangement:
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After rearranging (18), we can distinguish two possible equilibria (all other possi-
bilities violate the restriction 0 ≤  q ≤  1), which we obtain by taking the square root 
on both sides. We get:
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As expected, a higher b and a higher k result in a higher chosen level of fighting 
activity, since the first partial derivatives of (22) and (23) with respect to b are:
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and
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These are always positive, provided t < 1+k. In addition, it can also be shown that 
the first partial derivatives of q1 and q2 with respect to k are positive. They are:
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and
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The equations (26) and (27) are always positive if 1 .b t θ
pi
≥ +
Interesting consequences appear, when θ and π, the elasticities of produc-
ing and fighting, or to put it differently, the impact of a marginal change of the 
amount of production and fighting activity on the output, are considered.
In the case of the “good” equilibrium q1 (where q is low), an increase in θ 
decreases q (the partial derivative of q with respect to θ is always negative). This 
seems intuitive for a situation, where incentives work properly. By contrast, for 
the “bad” equilibrium q2, the so-called “fighting warlords” trap, a greater value 
of θ actually increases q (the partial derivative of q with respect to θ is always 
positive). The equilibrium value q2 is a “high” conflict outcome, where a great 
proportion of the population has an incentive to engage in fighting rather than 
producing through more conventional means. This means, that when fighting is 
generalized in our model, even an increase in the elasticity of traditional produc-
tion will not only leave the situation unchanged but will push an even higher 
proportion of the population into fighting. The society in question is then caught 
in what can be called a “fighting warlords trap.”9
9 This particular finding is compatible with the point made by De Soysa et al. (1999) that there 
are high rates of civil wars in agrarian societies since production can here take any form. Notice 
that agricultural productivities are relatively low in agrarian societies. Moreover, these are often 
also producers of natural resources. 
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However this process has a limit, which is given by the ratio .θ
pi
 If θ is  > π, then 
the denominator of the fraction, which determines q2 becomes negative and thus 
q2 itself is negative, which contradicts our assumptions. Thus, if θ > π only the q1 
solution is possible. The ratio θ
pi
 constitutes thus a bifurcation which establishes 
the possibility or not of such a “fighting warlords” trap. In other words, a massive 
increase in θ through a better internalization of the natural resource externality 
or a greater capacity to produce without fighting will make the “warlord trap” 
equilibrium impossible.
Thus, the higher the profits made with natural resources under a stable polit-
ical system regime relative to those made under a system of competing warlords 
are, the less likely is the latter to occur. 
Further, higher probabilities of an international cartel for the natural 
resource, Pm, and of an operating property rights protection and rule of law 
system, Pp, increase the likelihood of a stable political system outcome by 
increasing xi and y in equation (15). On the other hand, higher immediate gains 
from fighting, b, and higher initial commitments for producing, k, increase both 
the risk of civil war.
If the immediate gains from natural resources, b, have a clearly negative 
impact on the democratization and the establishment of the rule of law, the 
impact of π depends on the values of several other parameters. To deal with 
those, recall that equation (15) expresses θ in terms of π:
This relation illustrates the idea that if the gains of the natural resource 
exploitation technology under a regime of warlordism, π, are bigger than the 
gains of production in a stable political system, θ, it is because of the bigger quan-
tity of natural resources exploited, due to overuse. This point is also made, as 
mentioned, in Chichilnisky (1994).
Clearly, these bigger gains from the warlordism exploitation technology are 
not sustainable in the long-run, because of the negative impact of over-exploi-
tation. From an evolutionary point of view the gain from exploiting natural 
resources, π, should approach zero in the long-run.
It is interesting to see what the implications of extreme values of π are on the 
level of q. If we replace θ by its value defined in relation (15) we get the following 
equations:
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For a very small q, we would get in the square root, which is in the denominator of 
the above fractions, almost just the standard (as opposed to the resource) produc-
tion, xi , divided by a very small number, which would result in the value of the 
square root becoming increasingly large. We have thus:
 0
lim 0q
pi→
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(27)
By contrast, as π approaches infinity, xi/π becomes very small within the square 
root, which leaves:
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(28)
Thus, within the framework of the present model, a very low level of natural 
resources decreases the risk of a civil war outcome to close to zero, whereas for 
medium and high levels of natural resources we obtain higher levels of q. But 
the relationship between π and q is not monotonous. These implications are in 
accord with the empirical findings of Collier and Hoeffler (1998).
12  Coalition behavior
Our coalition type game is based upon the notion of “oceanic games,” a concept 
introduced by Milnor and Shapley (published 1978 but elaborated earlier in a 
RAND paper) and then further developed by Straffin (1977). If a society is divided 
up into coalition kernels N and M (for instance two opposing factions) and a 
large number of uncommitted bystanders U, the coalition dynamic can result in 
bystanders joining either N or M based either on uncommitted evaluation of the 
probability of N or M overtaking the other faction (i.e., join the likely winner) 
or conversely on the fear that such a perspective might actually occur (defend 
the possible loser for fear of the likely winner). We thus rejoin the considerations 
made earlier about emotional aspects of mobilization for conflict. Once coalitions 
are established, mobilization of their respective strengths in numbers can occur, 
social distance between them will increase and then conflict and violent clashes 
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can happen. These will be simulated with territorial and information issues 
introduced.10
Clearly, the coalition perspective, which can reiterate some aspects of the 
emotional factors in conflict, shows how confrontations can be influenced and 
enhanced by their own dynamics. In other words, conflict begets conflict as more 
and more individuals are drawn into it. This is in our view the main value added 
of the present approach: Whereas other conceptions stay at a relatively static 
level, our vision leads to an endogenous possible amplification (or for that matter 
reduction) of conflict.
In order to model how violence and conflict can break out, one can conceive 
of sets of potential coalitions of fighters whose numbers will grow as a result of the 
advantage of joining such a group as opposed to staying neutral or uncommitted.
Suppose we have group n and group m opposed to each other within the 
population of N members. For group n we can express this in the following way:
 
( ) ( )A n A u
n u
∂
≥
∂  
(29)
In other terms, it is worth joining a group of n potential fighters if the advantages 
A(n) where n represents the number of fighters within group N are greater than 
those A(u) of remaining uncommitted (u). The advantages of remaining uncom-
mitted tend to diminish as the total number of fighters increase. This notion 
should not mean that joining a coalition is necessarily voluntary. Our formulation 
reflects among other things the fact that uncommitted members of society can be 
coerced into fighting the more fighters there are so that staying uncommitted gets 
to be extremely costly. So if we assume that the advantages of joining increase 
logarithmically with an expansion in the number of a group’s committed fighters 
and that the advantages of staying within the uncommitted group u diminish lin-
early with the percentage of fighters in the society q. So that we have then:
 
ln( ) ( )
( )
n A qN
n N n m
χ∂ −
=
∂ − +  
(30)
10 Clearly our intention is to go farther here than conceptions based solely upon micro-level 
analyses such as the ones by Kalyvas (2006) and Kalyvas and Kocher (2009). While the con-
ceptual importance of the territorial approach pioneered by him is fully acknowledged, it begs 
the question of the origins and developments of armed groups and their recruitment dynamics 
which cannot be uniquely based upon the provisions of collective and private goods and co-
ercion at least in the beginning of a conflict. Incentives to fight based upon general economic 
conditions certainly have a place in the analysis as we are trying to suggest here.
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and thus n:
 
( )N mn
A qN
χ
χ
−
=
− +  
(31)
Similarly we should have for m:
 
ln( ) ( )
( )
m B qN
m N n m
ξ∂ −
=
∂ − +  
(32)
and finally m is:
 
( )
( )( ) ( )
N A qNm p
B qN A qN A qN
ξ
χ ξ
−
=
− − + + −  
(33)
These give us values for evolving ns and ms .
Here χ and ξ are adjustment parameters which can be interpreted as the evolv-
ing inverses of the probabilities of success of one or the other coalition (so these 
parameters can vary over time). Such parameters can help taking into consideration 
events that are not covered within the framework of the model such as the interna-
tional context: For instance, the beginning of what has been called the Arab spring 
had an influence which extended way beyond the borders of Tunisia and Egypt. It 
showed to other populations of the Middle Eastern region that regime change was 
possible. This hikes the probability of an uprising to be successful and lowers the 
probability of the existing regime to stay in power. This does not mean however that 
the regime will then necessarily crumble. A and B are parameters representing the 
initial advantages of staying uncommitted with respect to either n or m.
13  Combat model
Combat equations can now be written in the following way if one assumes that n 
corresponds to insurgents and m to the dominant group:
 
10( 1 2 )dcombn par par n par combncombm
dt
= −
 
(34)
 
10( 3 4 )dcombm par par n par m
dt
= − +
 
(35)
 
5 6 7dtarn par n par par nm
dt
= −
 
(36)
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6 1 ( 8 ) 0
0
par if par combm combn
otherwise
= − <
 
(37)
 survn n tarn= −  (38)
 
1 210 1 if *
0
par q and q q
otherwise
= >
 
(39)
(34) is a Deitchman-Lanchester (Deitchman 1962) equation describing dispersed 
combat with replacement. This corresponds to a situation where a dominant 
group blankets an area to hit insurgents. combn and combm are variables rep-
resenting combatants of n and m respectively. Their evolution is described in 
(34) and (35) as combats develop as functions of kill probabilities and of replace-
ments from the larger groups n and m. In dispersed combat, losses depend on 
chance encounters (product) of combatants, par2 is a parameter expressing 
kill likelihoods in a encounter; par1 represents a replacement parameter where 
a fraction of n replaces n’s losses. (35) is a Lanchester concentration equation 
since insurgents can target dominant combatant groups in a concentrated way 
through ambushes. Here par3 and par4 represent respectively a kill likelihood 
and a replacement rate. (36) Expresses the notion that an insurgent group can be 
targeted (tarn) through intimidation and massacres that will affect its total popu-
lation directly (without the intermediary of combat). This situation is now extant 
in Syria for instance. The survivor population (survn) defined in (38) will account 
for the effects of this massacre strategy. Relation (37) represents conditions under 
which massacres and intimidations will occur: essentially when one group of 
combatants is numerically strong enough to threaten seriously the domination of 
the more powerful group. Fear of a strong change in the balance of power should 
then trigger massacres. The parameter par6 indicates that this will occur when 
the combatants of the insurgent group reaches a certain size determined by par8: 
For instance if group n combatants reach parity or superiority over group m fight-
ers. Finally in (39) par10 represents a logical switch which specifies that fight-
ing will only start whenever the fighting propensities q1 and q2 are greater than a 
minimal threshold level q*. In other words, if the intensity to fight is low enough 
in a society, no combats will actually take place.
Clearly, the coalition perspective, which can reiterate some aspects of the 
emotional factors in conflict, shows how confrontations can be influenced and 
enhanced by their own dynamics. In other words, conflict begets conflict as more 
and more individuals are drawn into it. This is in our view the main value added 
of the present approach: Whereas other conceptions stay at a relatively static 
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level, our vision leads to an endogenous possible amplification (or for that matter 
reduction) of conflict.
This model can lead to conflict escalation and stable societal conflict traps. 
On the other hand, we show also that such situations are basically inefficient and 
that in fact any unequal situation within society that is not compensated by trans-
fers from the more powerful or wealthier to poorer segments of society is ineffi-
cient. This particular result illustrates the neuroscience finding that increased 
inequality in a social hierarchy favors conflict. To show how the conflict dynam-
ics can work in our framework, we will use the following Figure 4: 
Some of these conclusions will be illustrated below with the help of our simu-
lation model.
14  Simulation model construction
The relations presented above can now be coded in a simulation model, which 
is for the moment written in the context of the SPARE system developed at the 
Graduate Institute. This system allows us to write directly dynamic relations and 
recursive algebraic equations. Once the model is formulated different scenarios 
Incentives to fight:
individual rent seeking
model Yes or No
Mobilization by coalition
kernel N or M
constitution of fighting
groups through
recruitment
Demographics
economy
natural resources
Confrontation, casualties, attrition
representation through
geographically referenced
combat model
Figure 4: Schematic Representation of our Agent Based Model.
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suggested by the mathematical analysis done above can be investigated. In par-
ticular, the kind of coalition behavior, which can amplify conflict behavior, can 
be analyzed in this way. The simulation model is subdivided into basic economic 
relations, fighting incentive relations, coalition behavior and combat equa-
tions. In principle the model can be regionalized to various geographical entities 
depending on the availability of data such as macroeconomic and demographic 
variables at the regional and sub-regional levels. Here is the transcription of the 
model script:
 > DYNAMIC CONFEMO
*
***
T = T$
*
*
*
*
** BASIC ECONOMIC EQUATIONS
E = (SQRT(P**S)*SQRT(H+1)*(SQRT(TPOP)-1)**2)/TPOP
*
Z = AC*SQRT(TPOP)*SQRT(P**S)*(SQRT(TPOP)-1)/DZ
 DZ = SQRT(H+1)*((P**S)+SQRT(TPOP)*TPOP*(H+1)+SQRT(P**S)*SQRT(H+1)*
(1+SQRT(TPOP)))
POP. = (BETH-ALPH)*POP
TPOP = POP+CMBPN
K. = NXI*H-RHO*K-LAMBD*(COMBN+COMBM)
NXI = EXP(ZET-GAM/K-ETH/(TPOP-COMBN-COMBM))
*
*FIGHTING INCENTIVE EQUATIONS
Q1 = (1-TA+KA)/((1-BA+SQRT(THETA/PI)*(1+KA))**2)
*Q2 = (1-TA+KA)/((1-BA-SQRT(THETA/PI)*(1+KA))**2)
W1 = (1-TA+KA-(1-BA)*Q1)/(1+KA)
*W2 = (1-TA+KA-(1-BA)*Q2)/(1+KA)
W = W1
Q = Q1
PI = (THETA-XI)/(1-PHI)
PHI = -Y*E+Z
XI = NXI/(TPOP-COMBN-COMBM)
*COALITION FORMATION
N = (CHI*(CMBPN-M))/(A-Q*CMBPN+CHI)
M = MNUM/MDEN
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MNUM = (XSI*POP*(A-Q*POP))
MDEN = (B-Q*POP)*((A-Q*POP+CHI)+XSI*(A-Q*POP))
*COMBAT EQUATIONS
COMBN. = PAR12*(PAR1*CMBPN-PAR2*COMBN*COMBM)
COMBM. = PAR12*(-PAR3*COMBN+PAR4*M)
CMBPN. = PAR5*N-PAR13*PAR7*N*M
CMBDA. = PAR14*DAP-PAR15*CMBDA*COMBM
DAP. = PAR16*DAP
DIF =  PAR8*COMBM-COMBN
PAR13 = CONSTR(PAR6,0.,1.)
PAR6 =  -(COMPR(DIF)-1.)
DIF2 = QSTAR-Q
PAR11 = -(COMPR(DIF2)-1.)
PAR12 = CONSTR(PAR11,0.,1.)
15  Simulation scenarios
We will start exploring the possibilities of the model by using a pure simulation 
scenario with little relations to the empirical world. Rough calibrations have been 
carried out in order to account for the basic demographic and macroeconomic 
variables of Sudan to just take one practical example. However, at this stage as 
mentioned before no analogy should be drawn to a real situation. The scenarios 
are just there to show what drives the model.
What we see here in the above figure (Figure 5) is an increasing level of GDP 
for a country whose macroeconomic and demographic characteristics are like 
those of Sudan. Because of that (according to the model) things turn out well. 
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Figure 5: Calculated and Historical Values for Simulation Scenario: GDP.
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Enough resources are shared in such a way that the N coalition (in our conception 
the insurgent group) after rising initially declines (Figure 6).
But so does the dominant group coalition which loses strength as seen in 
Figure 7:
This diminishes the propensity to fight as shown in Figure 8.
Finally the number of combattants for N rises quite slowly but then stops 
growing as q diminishes enough to be below the combat threshold q* as shown 
in Figure 9:
We can now contrast this with an Economic Collapse Scenario that is rep-
resented in Figure 10:
In the economic collapse scenario capital growth slows down significantly 
which rsults in a significant lowering of GDP. The propensity to fight increases 
until leveling of at a high level plateau as shown in Figure 11:
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Figure 6: Simulation of Coalition Strength of Regime Opponents.
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Figure 7: Simulated Values of Pro-Regime Coalition.
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Figure 8: Evolution of Simulated Fighting Propensity  within the Society.
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Figure 9: Evolution of Simulated Number of Rebel Combatants.
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Figure 10: Evolution of GDP under a Simulated Economic Collapse Scenario.
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Figure 11: Evolution of Simulated Propensity to Fight under Economic Collapse Scenario.
The coalitions of both N and M increase in numbers as shown in Figures 12 
and 13 adding to the conflict escalation:
As a result, the number of fighters for N increases with associated combat 
damages on the armed forces of M (Figure 14).
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M coalition strength
M coalition strength evolution
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Figure 13: Evolution of Simulated Pro-Regime Coalition Strength under Economic Collapse 
Scenario.
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Figure 12: Evolution of Simulated Anti-Regime Coalition Strength under Economic Collapse 
Scenario.
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Figure 14: Evolution of Number of Anti-Regime Fighters under Economic Collapse Scenario.
16  Beyond pure simulations: the case of Syria
Syria has witnessed since 2011 an intensive civil war which has already resulted 
in aprroximately 160,000 deaths. It is harder to evaluate the number of casualties 
which must be much higher than that. The government of Bashar El Assad which 
relies very much on the Alaouite (roughly speaking a branch of Chiism) sect of 
Islam faces an uprising that envompasses mostly Suni Moslems but also Kurds, 
the two forces not cooperating necessarily always against him. This uprising has 
attracted some elements of the Syrian army but also islamist groups which makes 
it difficult for the anti Assad coalition to stick together. After some initial suc-
cesses by the anti-governement forces one seems to presently face a stalemate 
with a war of attrition going between both sides. How does our model do in this 
case? A priory, it seems hard to explain anything via some kind economic col-
lapse as sugggested by our simulation scenario because economic data show 
upward trends in the years before the uprising. But then Syrian data are notori-
ously unreliable and show some developments that cannot possibly be correct 
given the toll that the civil war inflicts upon the country, such as an increase in 
GDP in 2011. Earlier data show a marked slump in the beginning of the 2000s and 
it is likely that this slump continued with a slight attenuation through the end of 
the decade. Even with these unreliable informations our model reproduces the 
historical development rather well. For instance, population and GDP figures are 
well predicted by it as these two graphs of population calculated and observed 
and GDP calculated and observed11 for Syria reveal (Figures 15 and 16):
11 Our parameters are a priori evaluations and not statistical estimations, thus the use of correla-
tion coefficients rather than other statistics.
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Figure 15: Calculated and Observed Population Evolutions for Syria 1990–2015.
Source: Penn World Tables, Feenstra et al. 2013.
(R = 0.9966, p < 0.00001).
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Figure 16: Syria: GDP Real and Calculated 1995–2011.
Source: Penn World Tables, Feenstra et al. 2013.
(R = 0.982, p < 0.00001).
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In order to deal with the problems posed by the underestimations of the dif-
ficulties of the economic context in Syria, we relied heavily on another indicator of 
the uncertainty associated with the Syrian regime. This indicator was constructed 
by Thierry Lorho (Lorho et al. 2014). His approach is based upon an analysis of 
textual data about Syria, available mostly over the Internet, in the form of big quan-
tities of machine-readable documents. The textual material is analyzed via a Bayes-
ian algorithm called D-Bacl, which looks at the concatenation of various words and 
concepts in a text. These are then evaluated statistically according to their proba-
bilities of occurrence and the relationships that link them to each other. In this way 
the information content of each word and sequence of words can be assessed based 
upon Shannon’s information theory. Based upon this methodology, an uncertainty 
indicator for the Syrian regime is extracted from this information. As can be seen 
form the graph below, this indicator seems to capture well the evolution of the like-
lihood of regime collapse in the country. This likelihood reaches a maximum at the 
end of 2011–beginning of 2012 but then declines markedly. One can observe that the 
indicator predicts with a slight lag the evolution of total casualties for the Syrian 
civil war which give it high plausibility. These peak in early 2013 and then decline 
also significantly. This can be seen in the following graph (Figure 17):
-0.1
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020
Uncert
TOT fatalities
Figure 17: Uncertainty of Regime and Total Fatality Curves Syria. 
Source: Syria and Lebanon Blogspot http://ncfsyria.blogspot.ch/, Breakdown of monthly casu-
alty figures for Syria.
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17   Evolution of regime uncertainty and total civil 
war fatalities, Syria 2007–2015
We can now plug this indicator into our model. Its influence on the dynamics of our 
system is operating in two ways: First, through the evolving parameters χ and ξ (the 
complement of χ) that determine in part the changing coalition memberships of pro 
and anti-government forces as postulated in the relations (30) to (33). Parameter χ 
which is the probability of collapse of the governmental regime is thus expressed by 
the uncertainty indicator. Second, the uncertainty index also influences the propen-
sity to fight. The assumption being here that a high governmental uncertainty value 
increases the incentives to fight the authorities. The model reflects well such an evo-
lution in the membership of the government and insurgent coalitions. So as the gov-
ernment coalition first weakens in the years preceding the civil war and then during 
the beginning of it, it tends to strengthen again later from 2013 on to regain and even 
overcome its previous strength as illustrated by the graph below (Figure 18):
On the other hand, the insurgent coalition after rising in numbers from 2007 
on reaches a peak in 2011 and then seems to decline afterwards. In terms of future 
developments the fate of this coalition appears to be bleak. This is illustrated by 
the following graph (Figure 19):
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Figure 18: Syria: Evolution over Time of Government Backing Coalition.
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We can then also from these and from the propensity to fight variables post-
dict quite well to combattant total casualties (Figure 20):
So, overall, our model accounts in a satisfactory way for the evolution of the 
Syrian Civil War. This shows that our conception is not only able to generate plau-
sible hypothetical scenarios but also to represent empirical situations rather well. 
This opens new alleys for the study of the evolution of conflict in general and 
internal conflict in particular.
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Figure 20: Syria: Observed and Calculated Combatant Casualties 2011–2014 (R = 0.8599, 
p = 0.000687).
Source: Syria and Lebanon Blogspot http://ncfsyria.blogspot.ch/Breakdown of Monthly 
 Casualty Figures for Syria.
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Figure 19: Evolution over Time of  Insurgent Coalition.
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18  Conclusions
Quite clearly, if one follows the scenarios presented above, economic conditions 
drive the model since in one case sustained growth produces stability and end of 
combats whereas deteriorating capital growth and GDP collapse lead to increased 
hostile coalition participation and more fighting. However, things are not that 
simple since the mere trigger of economic conditions is insufficient to explain 
conflict escalation, which results from increased participation in mutually hostile 
coalitions and greater fighting propensity where emotions such as fear and 
resentment play their role. Without the postulated risk attitudes which translate 
these emotional aspects into mathematical and simulation language formulae 
the scenarios described above would not be conceivable. In some sense what our 
scenario analyses show so far is that external rewards (here the additional wealth 
derived from substantive growth rates) evoked by the neuro-science research 
play their role in attenuating conflict over time. It is remarkable to point out here 
to make an analogy to the Sudan situation, that the conflict between North and 
South essentially broke out initially as poor growth conditions prevailed but as 
these improved remarkably over the last decade, the situation essentially got 
better in terms of the hostilities and the compromise of separating the North from 
the South was made possible. Since we are again witnessing a deterioration of 
these conditions especially in South Sudan, it is not surprising that now this new 
country in in turn torn apart by a civil war.
The Syrian situation which constitutes here our main empirical example 
is interesting in the sense that here economic conditions alone do not trigger a 
response in the form of a civil war. It is the perceived and observed greater insta-
bility (or uncertainty) of the political institutions, which create the conditions for 
the civil war because these circumstances favor the perception that the regime is 
fundamentally weak and presents an opportunity for those who want to grab the 
power away from it. Moreover, the examples and diffusions of other Arab spring 
type movements certainly play a role here also. However, according to our indi-
cator, this opportunity is short-lived and ultimately reveals the weakness of the 
insurgent coalition whose future looks increasingly bleak. This shows that con-
flict resolution schemes have also to take into account perceptions of opportuni-
ties as means to correct long-term grievances.
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